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A B S T R A C T
Marine social-ecological systems are influenced by the way humans interact with their environment, and external forces, which change and re-shape the environ-
ment. In many regions, exploitation of marine resources and climate change are two of the primary drivers shifting the abundance and distribution of marine living
resources, with negative effects on marine-dependent communities. Governance systems determine ‘who’ makes decisions, ‘what’ are their powers and responsi-
bilities, and ‘how’ they are exercised. Understanding the connections between the actors comprising governance systems and influences between governance and the
environment is therefore critical to support successful transitions to novel forms of governance required to deal with environmental changes. The paper provides an
analytical framework with a practical example from Vanuatu, for mapping and assessment of the governance system providing for management of coral reef fish
resources. The framework enables a rapid analysis of governance systems to identify factors that can encourage, or hinder, the adaptation of communities to changes
in abundance or availability of marine resources.
1. Introduction
Climate change is already influencing the abundance and distribu-
tion of marine living resources in many parts of the world [1–6]. This
has profound consequences on the functioning of ecosystems and,
consequently, affects well-being of marine-dependent communities
deriving both direct (e.g. consumption and sale of fish) and indirect
(e.g. tourism) benefits from the resources [4,7,8]. These changes tend to
have negative effects but may also provide opportunities and positive
outcomes in certain circumstances and geographical locations [9].
Negative effects include conflicts between traditional, recreational and
commercial fishers over reduced availability of marine resources [10],
while positive changes may include new harvesting opportunities [11].
However, a gain for one community, industry or region may be a loss
for another. For example, the shift to the north and west of mackerel in
the North Atlantic in the early 2000s, possibly associated with climate
change, resulted in a decrease in abundance of the species in Norwegian
waters and an increase in the waters of the Faroe Islands and Iceland.
The increased abundance in their waters led the Faroe Islands and
Iceland to make unilateral decisions to increase their quotas sub-
stantially, leading to conflicts with Norway and the EU, which also fish
for mackerel in this region [12].
Autonomous and planned adaptation efforts by fishers, industry,
and management authorities to the changes in the resource system can
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be inhibited by barriers related to governance [13]. This is particularly
relevant in building adaptive capacity of fisheries in the context of
climate change [14]. Indeed, many problems observed in the biophy-
sical environment can be attributed to the functioning or mal-
functioning of governance systems – actors (individuals and organisa-
tions) and systems of rules (institutions) structuring their interactions.
Perverse market incentives, lack of enforcement measures, poor mon-
itoring and licencing systems, absent or inappropriate user rights con-
trol, loss of traditional management knowledge and authority are
among the causal determinants of human actions that degrade the
marine environment and increase the vulnerability of marine-depen-
dent communities [15–17]. Dealing with ecosystem changes and
overall resource sustainability arguably requires adaptive governance
which can anticipate environmental changes, develop and strengthen
social networks, build leadership and trust, support the acquisition of
knowledge to promote innovative responses to increase benefits, sup-
port adaptation, and minimise associated negative impacts to commu-
nities [4,18–21].
There is a high degree of common understanding of the general
structure and processes required for effective governance of human use
of marine resources, for example through fishing. The details and the
effectiveness of these structures and processes vary substantially across
different scales of activity, value of the activity and available govern-
ance or management capacity [e.g. [22]] but the fundamentals remain
the same. In essence, effective marine governance requires under-
standing the social, economic and ecological features and dynamics of
the system. It also entails being clear about the objectives, and setting
rules and regulations to achieve those objectives, ensuring as far as
possible that those rules and regulations are adhered to. Another im-
portant aspect is to monitor changes in key indicators of social, eco-
nomic and ecological status and well-being, and revising the rules and
regulations, and sometimes objectives, as necessary to respond to
change [23–25].
The current prevailing practice in fisheries, as an important example
of marine resource use, is that the ecological, or biological, objectives
for a particular case are typically set in the form of reference points,
either targets to be aimed for, such as a preferred biomass or abundance
at which sustainable yield remains high, or limit reference points,
below which yields become low and sustainability may be threatened.
A wide range of management tools can then be applied to ensure that
use of a resource adheres to those reference points [e.g. [26]]. When
applied effectively, these tools have frequently been found to achieve
the desired results under relatively stable conditions but they were not
designed to build resilience and, while still necessary, are not ne-
cessarily sufficient under substantial environmental change, including
climate change. For marine resource use governance systems to cope
with climate change, they need to be able to respond both to known or
expected changes and also unexpected surprises [26].
Understanding the intricate connections between the actors com-
prising governance systems and between the governance system and
the environment is therefore critical to support successful transitions to
novel forms of governance required to deal with environmental
changes. However, developing an understanding of the structure and
functioning of marine governance systems is challenging [27]. Such
understanding must cross scales to develop a sound appreciation of
social and environmental dynamics, and to identify key institutions and
actors that influence adaptation at these different scales. It also requires
gaining insights into the behavioural attributes that influence in-
dividual and organisational decisions in order to better anticipate their
effects on the resource system and to determine the best course of ac-
tion.
There is a growing body of the literature that identifies a range of
governance attributes that are positively linked to successful adaptation
of resource-dependent societies to environmental change [e.g. [21,
28–30]]. A range of frameworks and analytical approaches have been
developed to assist with the identification and analysis of various
individual, community and management attributes, as well as political
and economic aspects that influence adaptive capacity of marine
communities [see [31]]. They include vulnerability assessments
[27,32], and analyses of implementation of ecosystem approaches to
fishery management (EBFM) [16,25,33,34]. Researchers have also
identified specific management attributes that contribute to sustainable
harvest outcomes [e.g. [23]]. However, studies that aim to analyse the
complexities of governance and the relationships between governance
and ecological systems across different social, economic and political
contexts are rare. Proposed frameworks and sets of adaptation princi-
ples and criteria tend to offer general insights into various governance
attributes deemed relevant for climate change adaptation. At the same
time, they do not uncover complexities of individual governance sys-
tems to demonstrate how they incorporate proposed attributes or could
be reformed to improve adaptive capacity. In particular, substantial
knowledge gaps remain with respect to methodological approaches to
analysing complex governance systems in diverse marine-dependent
communities [but see [35]].
This article presents an analytical framework and practical guide-
lines designed to gain detailed insight into relevant aspects of the op-
eration and structure of marine governance systems to examine their
capacity to adapt to changes in marine resources. It builds on Ostrom's
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework [36,37],
which is a generic framework that disaggregates (or ‘unpacks’) com-
ponents of complex social-ecological systems (SES) into common sets of
elements. The framework has been widely applied to structure analysis
of various common-pool resource management systems, including
fisheries [e.g. [38,39]] and is constantly refined following tests in dif-
ferent situations [40]. We unpack components of the IAD framework by
structuring several sub-systems of marine resource governance to de-
velop detailed understanding of how these components interact and
affect the state of the resource system. Governance mapping [29,41] is
employed as a method to capture and visualise the dynamics of the
system. The framework provides foundation for the assessment of
marine governance systems to identify specific gaps and opportunities
and the ability of actors to address environmental problems, including
climate change.
The next section of the paper describes the conceptual foundations
of the study after which governance mapping is described. The frame-
work for assessing the vulnerability of marine governance systems is
demonstrated using a case study from Vanuatu in the Western Pacific.
2. Conceptual background
2.1. Governance, institutions and actors
The concept of ‘governance’ describes ‘who’ makes decisions, ‘what’
their powers and responsibilities are, and ‘how’ they exercise this power
and influence [42:116]. Governance generally consists of two inter-
acting components: the institutional framework and the organisational
system [43:28]. While institutions define how actors work, actors re-
spond to institutions and may in turn shape and modify them [44].
In essence, institutions structure human interactions with the pur-
pose of creating greater behavioural regularity and increased predict-
ability of interactions and outcomes [44,45]. Institutions can include
‘formal’ (written) rules that are articulated in laws, regulations,
agreements, policies, plans and other regulatory instruments, and ‘in-
formal’ rules [39] which are embedded in established practices, cus-
toms, shared discourses, informal agreements and understandings, roles
and routines (i.e. social norms) [46,47]. Both formal and informal rules
tend to operate in parallel and are considered effective (i.e. rules ‘in
use’) when they define and transform behaviour [48:54].
Individual actors are the smallest ‘acting unit’ [47] of the govern-
ance system undertaking different roles. They can, for instance, be
customary leaders, resource managers, fishers and/or consumers. Their
behaviour in these different roles is influenced by the formal and
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informal rules as well as their individual attributes such as their in-
formation processing capacity, worldview, preference or motivation,
and capabilities [45,47,49–51]. Individuals are also affected by emo-
tions and unconscious motivations which influence the way they in-
terpret information and make decisions [50,52–56]. As such, psycho-
logical and social processes interact and create an exchange system in
which power relations, personal motivations, conflict, cooperation and
coordination shape decision-making [51,57].
Individuals can operate as an organised body of people (organisa-
tional actors), who have a particular purpose [43:28] and are guided by
a set of rules that structure their interactions to achieve organisational
goals [45]. A community, government agency, fisheries body, or a
commercial business are all examples of organisational actors. In
marine SES organisational actors may perform different functions such
as fishing compliance monitoring, post-harvest production, or servicing
of the sector [58]. The behaviour of these organised groups of actors is
determined by individual processes as well as the organisational goals
and processes, interpersonal information processing capacities, and
available human, technical and financial resources [49]. The ability of
organisational actors to learn and create, or modify, norms, policies,
and objectives will affect their ability to adapt [43].
In resource management governance systems can take many forms.
Each comes with particular advantages and disadvantages, but with
respect to fisheries management they can be grouped in the following
five types [according to [39, 57]]:
a) Bureaucracy-based: The government owns the resource property
rights on behalf of the public. The focus is on developing regulation
to sustainable stock levels while also meeting social and economic
objectives (input controls). Developing management plans can be
quite a fraught process when trade-offs between objectives and
stakeholder groups apply and conflicts arise. Policy adjustment can
be costly and time-consuming and the ability to adapt to, for in-
stance, stock fluctuations, technological advances, or changing
socio-economic and political conditions can be reduced.
b) Market-based: Property rights are transferred from government to
resource users, for instance, using individual transferable quotas
(ITQ) in combination with the total allowable catch (TAC; an output
control). The role of the regulatory authorities is to determine the
TAC and to distribute this among rights holders, in some cases al-
lowing temporary or permanent transfers of the rights. Compared to
a bureaucracy-based arrangement, a market-based arrangement is,
in principle, more adaptive because decisions on TAC are de-
termined on a yearly or seasonal basis. Adjustments to the TAC are
mostly driven by environmental factors. However, quotas may be
also influenced by social, economic or even political considerations.
Generally economics factors prevail and less emphasis is placed on
social objectives, such as maintaining social equity and small-scale
fishing communities [59].
c) Community-based: Property rights are held by a community of
people or a sub-group within a community. While different types of
regulation can structure the system, the behaviour is influenced by
social norms which can also sanction non-compliance. Different
goals and values can be embedded in community-based arrange-
ments, which may contrast with commercial harvest initiatives.
These include resource user control, the preservation of community
culture and transmission of traditional knowledge, internal ac-
countability, and preservation of small fishers and communities.
Adaptation may be aided or hindered in community-based man-
agement depending on the flexibility and inherent strength of the
social or cultural system within which it is embedded [60].
d) Co-management: The management responsibility is shared between
government and user groups [61]. Co-management arrangement can
be combined with market-based incentives (i.e. where ITQ rights-
holders agree on the TAC for the next period). Co-management
forms have been developed as they can create a sense of ownership
and responsibility and improves decision-making and uptake of
local knowledge. For example, local knowledge can improve the
quality and timeliness of information used to manage these systems.
They can also result in better choices of alignment of local condi-
tions and the institutional arrangement, which in theory can reduce
transaction costs. Co-management arrangements are unique in that
they can combine policy instruments to fit local conditions.
e) Network governance: An autonomous governance system with leg-
ally independent actors who create “products or services based on
implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental con-
tingencies and to coordinate and safeguard changes” [57]. This type
of governance supports learning through network connections and
appears to be more adaptive. For this reason it is becoming more
frequent in common-pool resource management such as fisheries
[62,63] and in resource conservation [64]. In practice, hybrid forms
of governance are often applied with elements of a–e [e.g. [65,66]].
For example, formal inclusion of fishers in management decision-
making sometimes requires bureaucratic regulation of the fishery as
an industry [67].
Policy objectives can be achieved in different types of governance
systems [28]. However, understanding how they operate and perform
in particular contexts is important to identify challenges and opportu-
nities to improve resource use, management and adaptation [39].
2.2. Social-ecological systems and the institutional analysis and
development framework
The Social-ecological systems concept [68:18,69] places emphasis
on the interdependencies between people and ecosystems, and com-
plexity of ecological, social and social-ecological interactions. Ostrom
[69:419] identifies four universal and interacting building blocks of
regularised social interactions at any governance level: resource sys-
tems (e.g. fishery, grazing areas); resource units (e.g. fish, feed); gov-
ernance systems, and users. The components affect each other and as-
sociated social, economic and political settings and related ecosystems
[see [70], also in Appendix A].
The IAD framework [36,37] conceives SES through the lens of
nested ‘action arenas’, which are the social spaces where actors interact
[70:11]. They consist of actors – individuals and organisations – who
make choices in various action situations and produce particular modes
of interactions and outcomes. Action arenas are affected by three sets of
exogenous variables: (a) biophysical and material conditions, (b) the
attributes of the community, and (c) the rules or set of instructions that
lead to an action situation [47:17]. We apply the concept of action
arena to further unpack the structure of marine SES.
2.3. Functional structure of marine SES
Governance systems can affect the functioning of marine SES in
many different ways. For example, the rules can prescribe the bound-
aries of the resource system, specify what and how many resource units
can be harvested, and in which locations and during which time per-
iods. The rules can define who has the right to harvest and which
technologies are allowed. They can also specify resource and com-
pliance monitoring and sanctioning processes, and information gath-
ering and exchange processes. Actors can be authorised to change some
of the established rules or adopt new rules [40]. In practice, there are
multiple types of actor interactions and outcomes which cumulatively
affect human-resource interactions and outcomes. This raise the issue of
how to approach governance characterisation and assessment in a
structured way.
In essence, actors make choices and interact in interconnected sub-
systems in various action situations and produce a broad range of
outcomes [40,71]. As McGinnis [71] demonstrates, any resource gov-
ernance system can perform at least nine generic functions:
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consumption, financing, production, provision, monitoring and sanc-
tioning, rule-making, coordination and dispute resolution. Drawing on
this study, the IAD framework [69] and review of interactions that tend
to be regulated in fishery statutes, we propose to distinguish between
five functional governance sub-systems in marine SES (Table 1). They
produce different sets of outcomes – regulatory framework (Resource
planning and regulation), extraction levels (Resource allocation and ex-
traction), resource demand (Consumption, production and distribution),
compliance (Compliance monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution),
and knowledge about the state of the resource (Resource monitoring and
information exchange) – cumulatively affecting human-resource inter-
actions in the SES (Fig. 1).
In what follows, the application of the governance mapping analy-
tical framework will be demonstrated to unpack a marine SES, map its
elements and assess their potential to contribute to, or hinder, adap-
tation to changes in the resource.
3. Methods
3.1. Governance mapping
Governance mapping is a process of cognitive or conceptual map-
ping; a methodology used to help articulate ideas in a manner that
unpacks meaning to the degree that others can understand [29,72].
Governance maps depict the actors–both individuals and organisa-
tions–in their social positions and their existing or potential interactions
in ‘action arenas’ mediated by institutions [41,72,73]. Maps can depict
actor networks within one or across several governance systems.
The approach proposed in this paper consists of four steps to collect
data and construct maps to describe and assess marine governance
systems (See Appendix A for more detailed instructions).
3.1.1. Define the policy issue
Governance mapping is purpose driven and aimed at addressing
Table 1
Governance sub-systems performing key governance functions in marine social-ecological systems.
Sub-systems Description
Resource planning and regulation (rule-making) Governs actors’ involvement in regulation of resource allocation, extraction and distribution
Resource allocation and extraction Governs actor – resource interactions, including resource use, ownership, allocated amounts, extraction technologies,
permitted harvesting areas, seasons and types of resource units.
Consumption, production and distribution Governs consumption, processing, distribution and sales of marine resources
Compliance monitoring, sanctioning and conflict
resolution
Governs control of harvesting activities, compliance and conflict resolution
Resource monitoring and information exchange Governs monitoring of the state of marine resources and processes of knowledge/information generation and exchange
Fig. 1. Key linkages of governance sub-systems in marine social-ecological systems.
L.X.C. Dutra, et al. Marine Policy 106 (2019) 103392
4
specific policy issues and problems [29]. The first step is to define the
policy issue of concern and select focal unit(s) of analysis [40]. This
includes the definition of system boundaries, such as geographical area
(e.g. coastal zone, reef), type of resource (e.g. targeted fish species,
ecosystem), and the nature of human-environment interactions (e.g.
resource extraction, pollution, conservation) (Table A1; Appendix A).
Confining the analysis to specific policy issues and focal units (e.g.
particular coastal communities) is necessary as many large-scale policy
problems, such as climate change adaptation, can be otherwise over-
whelmingly complex and involve large numbers of actors operating at
different administrative levels and scales.
3.1.2. Describe the SES
Identifying and describing socioeconomic and biophysical char-
acteristics of the SES are essential to understand the challenges that
affect the resource and identify which institutions and actors are or can
be effective in addressing them. Ostrom's elaboration of the components
of SES [69,74] provides a useful approach to identify the range of
variables affecting the operation and sustainability of SES (Table A2;
Appendix A; see also [75,76]).
Marine SES are not isolated units. Various pressures such as water
pollution, agricultural runoff and coastal development can influence the
abundance and distribution of marine resources [77]. Examining how
these sectors interact and influence one another enables the identifi-
cation of external opportunities and threats affecting the SES and
people's capacity to adapt to current or future changes in the resource
(Table A3; Appendix A).
3.1.3. Identify actors and interactions
A governance map cannot be produced until the causal links be-
tween exogenous variables, actors, interactions and outcomes are es-
tablished. The process of gathering institution-actor data consists of two
interactive steps. The first involves identifying and describing actors in
positions (e.g. resource users, knowledge providers, enforcement au-
thorities) (Table A4; Appendix A). The second involves determining
patterns of interactions and the rules that authorise or influence the
interactions within a sub-system (Tables A5 and A6; Appendix A). The
main output of this step is data tables that support the development of
governance maps (Section 3.1.4) and governance assessment (Section
3.2).
In climate change adaptation research, this step involves obtaining
data on actor's attributes that influence their ability to adapt to changes
in the resource system selected for the analysis. Actors in marine SES
are constantly adapting in response to resource variability (e.g. eco-
system and management changes) [78]. For example, important attri-
butes of resource users are their motivation to undertake actions re-
quired to (sustainably) exploit the resource (e.g. decrease catch, switch
to consumption of other resources, change equipment, cooperate with
other users), their capacities (e.g. skills, availability of resources to
switch to extraction of other species, access to other sources of income),
and ability to learn and obtain information about the state of the re-
source [78,79]. Authority, trust, leadership, flexibility to make deci-
sions, capacity to obtain information and enforce rules are important
attributes of management authorities [[79] and references within].
3.1.4. Create governance maps
Visual maps are created to represent the governance system in
graphic form. In mapping governance systems, it is important to define
the levels of complexity, depth and detail to be included in each sub-
system or component and be clear about the intended audience, aims
and outcomes of the map. For example, in some cases a map of the
relationship between governance sub-systems will be sufficient to de-
pict the issues related to governance. In other cases, it will be necessary
to detail the actors in each sub-system according to rules governing the
interactions between them, and to represent the outcomes from these
interactions.
The mapping process starts with a list of actors and interactions (See
Table A7, Appendix A as example) and involves the choice of map
elements and symbols, and decision on how to represent relationships
in the map, e.g. colours, shapes, lines. This is a very important step and
should not be neglected as the adequate choice of map elements is es-
sential for system understanding and effective communication. In the
example described in Section 4 we chose to represent the ‘Resource
planning and regulation’ sub-system in black and white as a relation-
ship map. A white circle and a thick black outline represent ‘govern-
ment’ and ‘community’ authorities; one letter inside the circle was used
to represent their names. Actors are represented as flat coloured circles
with white text within, in the form of two uppercase letters that identify
actor names. White circles with thin black line represent actions or
authority, connecting ‘government’ and ‘community’ to actors. Full
lines represent an interaction that is known and understood and that
must happen for the action to flow. Dashed lines represent interactions
that are optional or not well understood.
The relationship map does not show, however, how specifically
each actor navigates the system and what roles or positions they have in
other sub-systems (e.g. consumer, knowledge provider etc.). Hence,
there might be a need to create a “story cycle” diagram for each of the
actors to show, mostly in a sequential logic, how they behave in the
system - their actions and interactions with other actors – to accomplish
their aims. The Actor Story Cycle is based on the actor-interaction table
(Table A7; Appendix A) where interactions of each actor are detailed.
The Story Cycles are accompanied by information about the actor and
their roles and motivations. For the Story Cycles a white circle with a
thick coloured outline and two letters to represent their names were
used. The sub-systems are colour coded, meaning that every actor that
belongs to a particular sub-system is represented with the same colour.
Actors are represented as flat coloured circles with white text within, in
the form of two uppercase letters that identify actor names. Full and
dashed lines were the same as in the relationship map.
3.2. Framework for assessing vulnerability of marine governance systems
The assessment step evaluates how the SES governance performs
against criteria characterising effective adaptation. It requires decisions
regarding the following assessment design elements: (1) assessors; (2)
points of reference, (3) assessment criteria and (4) assessment methods,
discussed in detail below.
3.2.1. Select assessors
Assessment of governance can be undertaken using a range of
techniques from interactive participatory approaches to more rapid
expert appraisal. Selecting assessors thus depends on the nature of as-
sessment, which can range from a first-pass rapid assessment to a full
in-depth assessment. A rapid assessment can use the literature and ex-
pertise of the assessors to provide a preliminary, or ‘first-pass’ assess-
ment of one or more sub-system of interest. It can be undertaken
without detailed data to develop a preliminary understanding about the
governance issues [80]. In this assessment there is a risk of bias and
incoherence due to limited information sources and focus of expertise
[81,82]. Experts’ bias can be reduced through open discussions between
assessors about how they scored [82]. In order to cover different aspects
of governance performance, it is also recommended to employ an in-
terdisciplinary team of people (e.g. economics, political science, law,
marine ecology, fisheries) who have knowledge of the design and op-
eration of the SES in question. For the first-pass assessment of the case
study (Section 4), we have involved a small group of experts (scoring
process and assessors’ expertise are provided in Appendix C).
An in-depth assessment requires involvement of a broader group of
assessors to describe and assess the five proposed sub-systems.
Assessment can be conducted via surveys targeting a representative
sample and categorising data for detailed analysis of responses (e.g.
managers, resource users, male/female, age groups, etc.). A ‘Delphi
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type’ expert assessment method [83] can also be applied to the broad
stakeholder group.
3.2.2. Define points of reference
Assessment design involves the selection of normative points of
reference to which observed results can be compared and classified
[84,85]. Governance maps generally depict actors, interactions and
outcomes as they exist at a selected point in time. While the baseline
reference point tends to be the current state of the resource system,
different adaptation objectives can be selected for different timeframes
to assess the ability of governance system to cope with future changes.
For example, one can look at the adaptation objective of maintaining
marine livelihoods where current extraction levels of a certain species
are high (baseline). These can be changed and contrasted with alter-
native arrangements and biophysical drivers. For example, through the
use of scenarios in simulation models that can incorporate both the
biophysical projections and potential responses, such as restrictions in
extraction levels enforced through improved customary or government
authority [86,87:300–30].
3.2.3. Select assessment criteria
Criteria are normative statements specifying what performance as-
pects are evaluated [85]. Assessors are required to identify and de-
termine the relevance of various governance attributes from both in-
stitutional and organisational components of the governance system in
relation to the problem under analysis and evaluate how they can po-
tentially assist with or hinder the ability of the SES to cope with and
adapt to environmental changes.
The diversity of actors and interactions in marine SES implies
dealing with a broad range of governance attributes and evaluative
criteria. Different disciplines of environmental and social sciences have
provided a variety of insights into issues affecting adaptive capacity of
these SES [e.g. [69,74,79,88]]. Appendix B provides a non-exhaustive
list of attributes and assessment criteria that play a role in environ-
mental change adaptation and is based on a literature review [Tables
A8 and A9 Appendix A, [79,89]] contextualised into the variables of the
IAD framework affecting interactions and outcomes [69,74], combined
with the authors’ expertise. These are organised by governance sub-
system. The list is non-exhaustive, flexible and can be used as a starting
point in the development of assessment criteria. This means that criteria
can be added or modified to reflect the particular circumstances of the
SES under study. Each attribute or criterion may have different re-
levance for different policy issues or marine SES selected for the ana-
lysis. Therefore, their relative relevance can be assessed by scoring the
attributes and/or criteria, which can be performed as an aggregation
(e.g. mean values) at the appropriate level (e.g. sub-system, Actors,
Interactions and Outcomes).
Table 2 provides governance attributes and assessment criteria for
the Resource Allocation and Extraction sub-system, used in the example
presented in Section 4 to support a first-pass assessment and illustrate
the application of the analytical framework.
3.2.4. Select assessment method
In this study we illustrate the use of a semi-quantitative scoring
system [which is a robust approach in other studies, see [90,91]] using
standardised metrics that are comparable across different assessment
criteria (Table 2) and potential case studies.
The assessment of governance involves assigning scores for criteria
characterising interactions (I), actors (A) and outcomes (O) for each
sub-system. An overall ‘governance’ score can be calculated based on
the scores of criteria. Scores for individual sub-systems or for individual
governance attributes (Actors, Interactions and Outcomes) can also be
presented and contrasted to help identify issues and opportunities in the
governance system depending on the objectives of the scoring exercise.
For example, in the case study (Section 4) the objective of the scoring
exercise was twofold: to characterise the governance system and iden-
tify constraints and opportunities for adaptation in the Resource Allo-
cation and Extraction sub-system. The scoring system presented in
Table 3 has been used.
Assigning semi-quantitative scores to criteria to evaluate different
attributes of the SES governance helps identify gaps and opportunities
for each policy issue and is useful for comparative analysis. Such
Table 2
Attributes and assessment criteria characterising adaptive capacity of SES for Resource Allocation and Extraction sub-system.
Actors holding authority to control or allocate access to the
resource (A)
Authority is allocated to actors that have interest in long-term sustainability of the resource (i.e. motivation to
sustain the resource)
Authority is allocated to actors that have a knowledge of the resource system or capacity to obtain the
knowledge (i.e. learning capacity)
Authority is allocated to actors that have the capacity to undertake the role (e.g., availability of human,
financial and technical resources)
Authority is allocated to actors that are trusted
Authority is allocated to actors who have ability to facilitate cooperation and coordinate activities between
the various resource harvesters and users
Resource harvesters (A) Resource harvesting rights are allocated to actors that have interest in long-term sustainability of the resource
Resource harvesters are able to switch to harvesting of other resources or other sources of income
Resource harvesters have knowledge about sustainable harvest amounts and practices in their area
Extractive capacity of resource harvesters matches sustainable resource yields
Management authority allocation (I) Actors are enabled to control/adjust seasons, zoning or use other instruments to reduce pressures on the
resource
Actors are enabled to control/adjust resource amount or numbers of harvesters
Actors having stake in the resource are enabled to participate in the management of the resource (e.g. co-
management arrangements)
Resource allocation and management (I) Resource allocation processes are transparent and trusted
Collection and use of resource access fees is transparent and trusted
Effective integration of knowledge that supports resource allocation and management
Learning approach to allocation and management
Impacts on the resource (O) Sustainable extraction levels
Sustainable distribution of fishing pressures in the fishing area
Sustainable interactions with other systems (bycatch, impacts on other resources and supporting ecosystems)
Socio-economic outcomes (O) Benefits shared in a way that is perceived to be fair/equitable.
Access fees/other industry contributions are invested in the maintenance/improvement of the resource and
SES
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comparisons are useful to identify particular governance characteristics
that help minimise vulnerabilities and are effective in particular con-
texts (e.g. climate change adaptation), and situations (e.g. in sub-
sistence-based or commercial fisheries targeting external markets) [27].
However, scores are not meant for scaled comparisons to identify
‘better’ or ‘worse’ governance arrangements. The categories used for the
scoring can be used to support a broad governance assessment but the
‘full story’ can only be told using the characterisation framework
(Section 3).
4. Results: applying the methodological framework on a case
study
An example from inshore reefs in Vanuatu was used to illustrate the
governance mapping and assessment analytical framework. Note this is
‘first-pass’ illustrative assessment rather than a comprehensive defini-
tive one (refer to Section 3.2.1 for differences). Only the ‘Resource
Allocation and Extraction’ sub-system (Table 1) is described to illustrate
the analytical framework. The description of the sub-system under
analysis follows Aswani et al. [66], Love [92], Llewell [93] and the
Vanuatu Fisheries Act [94] as well as extensive regional experience of
one of the co-authors (S. Aswani).
The policy issue is overfishing in coral reefs in certain customary
areas referred to as ‘dead’ nakamal. Vanuatu people define a “dead”
nakamal as a specific inshore reef area which lacks direct locally and
culturally recognised sea owner descendants and leaders to govern the
use and access to them [66,92].
4.1. Structure of marine SES
The Government (G), through the Vanuatu National Fisheries (VNF)
Act recognises customary owners of marine areas, but also provides for
a centralised management where the state is responsible for formula-
tion, implementation and enforcement of policies (solid line between
management authority (Am) and G) (Fig. 2). Although traditional
practices are not explicit in the VNF Act, they are strongly recognised,
in the sense that the VNF Act requires customary owners to be con-
sulted about any issues affecting customary areas. In practice, the
government (G) works with customary leaders (chiefs; CL) and com-
munities and often give customary leaders some level of management
authority (Am) in marine management or conservation initiatives (da-
shed line between G and CL). These include the power to enforce,
distribute and allocate resources according to traditional laws, thus
actively incorporating traditional management systems into overall
fisheries management initiatives. This kind of co-management initiative
reinforces the powers chiefs (CL) have under customary laws, resulting
in fisheries regulations co-existing with traditional management me-
chanisms (with often positive impacts in fisheries resources; Fig. 3A).
Customary or community fishers (CF) must, in principle, abide to
both Fisheries regulations (which they often don’t) and traditional laws
(solid line between extraction authority (Ae) and CF; Fig. 2). They ex-
tract marine resources to feed their immediate family, sell or exchange.
The overall catch however is affected by decisions made by all fishers
extracting the resources in the area (CF) and Other Fishers (OF; e.g.
commercial or illegal fishers–details not covered in this ‘first pass’
analysis). Other fishers are not bound by customary law (voluntary
compliance) and their access and interactions with the resource is de-
termined by the Government actions authorising such access (solid line
between Ae and OF).
Problems with resource sustainability, however, emerge in dead
nakamal, where the community fails to appoint (Ap in Fig. 2) the cus-
tomary leader. As a result, there is no recognised customary leader with
authority to support traditional marine resource management. The
government alone, who granted rights to customary fishers, is unable to
control access or restrict species extraction and season harvests, be-
cause customary authority is disputed. In practice, customary authority
is absent or contested in dead nakamal, which provides strong in-
centives for inclusive and non-inclusive customary fishers alike to
overfish the resource [see tragedy of the commons, [95,96]] (Fig. 3B).
In principle, the Fisheries Act allows the government to facilitate a
process where fishers could discuss and agree on how to improve re-
source sustainability (dashed lines between G, Am, CF and OF), but this
link is absent in dead nakamal.
4.2. Assessment
The resource allocation sub-system in Vanuatu is shaped by rela-
tively recent history, migration, tenure claims, religion and colonisation
[66,92]. This indicates that some of the socio-cultural aspects of gov-
ernance, such as chiefly forms of political hierarchies (or nodal gov-
ernance), customary management and tenure systems must be under-
stood in order to promote adaptation.
The assessment is based on interpretation of information derived
from regulations [94], peer-review [66,92], and grey [93] literature
and was undertaken by the authors (details on expertise of assessors is
provided in Appendix C). In Vanuatu both government and customary
actors have authority to allocate and control extraction rights of coastal
marine resources. Therefore, scores were allocated to both ‘formal’ and
‘customary’ governance attributes, where applicable. When information
about the attribute was not found in the literature the assessment score
was given based on the opinion of the assessment team members having
expertise in Vanuatu fisheries or fisheries in the Pacific Islands. Scores
were subsequently reviewed by co-authors who have broad expertise in
fisheries resource management and governance. A risk of bias due to
limited literature sources and focus of expertise was minimised via cross
checking scores, and collective discussion and justification of scores
within the research team.
The scores for the Resource Allocation sub-system are shown in
Table 4. The mean score value for the ‘Resource Allocation and Ex-
traction’ sub-system is -1.1 (Outcomes: -1.8, Interactions: -0.3, Actors:
-1.2), which suggests it may fail in maintaining sustainable extraction
levels of the resource over time and is vulnerable in terms of facilitating
adaptation to changes in the resource system attributable to changing
environmental conditions (Table 4). The rationale for the scores is de-
tailed in following sections.
4.2.1. Authority to distribute fishing rights
4.2.1.1. Government. The Vanuatu National Fisheries (VNF) Act
provides for a centralised management where the state is responsible
to formulate, implement and enforce policies. The purpose of the
Fisheries Act is to ensure the government has a long-term interest in
the sustainability of the resource, but the government also has other
(conflicting) interests such as development and mining, which can
affect overall resource sustainability, hence the score: + 1. The
government has knowledge about the resource system but it is not as
extensive compared to knowledge locals have about the resource
(score: + 1).
There is no information from the sources used to score about the
capacity of government to undertake their role to distribute fishing rights.
However, as experience working in the region indicate, the
Government, through its Ministry of Fisheries, has very little power to
enforce legislation due to lack of human and financial resources (score:
Table 3




0 Neither effective nor ineffective
+1 Effective
+2 Extremely effective
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-1). Similarly, experience suggests that trust in government is low (score:
-1).
The Fisheries Act gives the authority to the Director of the
Department of Fisheries to work cooperatively with other government
agencies and fishers on issues related to fisheries. However, in dead
nakamal, the government is unable to facilitate sectoral cooperation and
coordinate activities between harvesters and users due to the disputes over
customary authority and resource ownership (score: 0).
Government authority is weak in dead nakamal because of weak/
absent customary authority. The government is not able to learn because
government officials are mostly based in Vanuatu's capital (Port Vila)
and are not properly involved in the management of resources in dead
nakamal (score: -1).
4.2.1.2. Customary leaders. The VNF Act gives people customary rights
to land and inshore reefs. Customary authorities have long-term interest
in the sustainability of the resource. However, dead nakamal lack such
customary authority due to lack of direct heirs or disputes, which
negatively affect the resource because in practice these areas are
perceived to be ‘open to all’ (score: -2). Despite the knowledge about
the resource system and the capacity to undertake their role customary
leaders have, the lack of customary authority negatively affects the
resource (score: -2 for both criteria). The disputes over customary
authority in dead nakamal highlights the distrust on customary leaders
(score: -2). Also, the combination of lack of, or disputes over, local
authority results in poor cooperation between sectors (e.g. government,
communities, tourism and fishing industries) and ineffective coordination of
activities between resource harvesters and users (score: -2). Customary
leaders have no authority over the resource and therefore, they are
unable to learn from undertaking this role (score: -2).
4.2.2. Resource harvesters
4.2.2.1. Customary fishers. The VNF Act gives resource harvesters, who
have an interest in the long-term sustainability of resources, rights over
inshore reef within certain limits established both by customary and
national laws. However, given the lack of customary authority to
manage access to the resource, dead nakamal are ‘open to all’ and
overfished (score: -2). Customary harvesters are able to switch to other
resources or sources of income, when opportunities exist. In some areas,
tourism and conservation measures provide opportunities for recovery
of certain fish populations when the initiative starts at the family level
in consultation with other communities. Such initiatives open-up
income opportunities both in the tourism and fishing sectors.
However, benefits are limited in dead nakamal because of over-
fishing (score: + 1). Given the open access nature of dead nakamal
fishers try to extract as much as they can as they perceive others are
doing the same, which indicates harvesters do not have the knowledge
about sustainable fishing practices (score: -2). In dead nakamal customary
fishers have more capacity to fish (number of fishers, fishing gear, etc.)
than the resource can sustain, leading to over-fishing (score: -2).
4.2.2.2. Other Fishers. Other fishers, such as commercial fishers, do not
necessarily have long-term interest in the sustainability of the resource. In
dead nakamal, where resources are over-exploited, other fishers will
also attempt to harvest as much as they can, further increasing fishing
pressure (score: -2). Other fishers are able to switch to other activities for
income (score: + 1). In dead nakamal there is no incentive for other
fishers to sustainably extract resources because the resource is ‘open to
all’ and because there is no pressure from customary fishers and
communities to reduce fishing pressure from other fishers (score: -2).
In dead nakamal resources are overfished, which indicates an over-
capacity of fishing (score: -2).
4.2.3. Authority allocation processes (I)
4.2.3.1. Government authority. The VNF Act give the government the
formal authority to control/adjust seasons, zoning or use other instruments
to reduce fishing pressure. However, the government has other
(conflicting) interests, such as coastal development and agriculture
(score: + 1). The VNF act gives the authority to the government to
control/adjust resource amount or numbers of commercial harvesters
through licenses and landing records (score: + 1). In dead nakamal
fishers do not participate in the management of the resources because they
cannot agree on how to improve fisheries management due to the
‘open-access’ nature of the area and weak or absent customary
authority (score: -2). The VNF Act allows the government to
facilitate a process where fishers could discuss and agree on how to
Fig. 2. Non-comprehensive example of governance map for the resource allocation sub-system, showing actors, interactions and outcomes as impacts on fisheries in
dead nakamal.
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improve resource sustainability, but such capacity is not yet performed
by the government.
4.2.3.2. Customary authority. Although the VNF Act does not expressly
recognise customary practices, there is high-level recognition of their
application in fisheries management in the constitution. Despite the
lack of formal recognition, the government do engage with
communities and empowers customary leaders to carry on their roles
and responsibilities under customary law. Therefore, there is semi-
formal authority rule from the government that enables customary actors
to control/adjust seasons, zoning to reduce fishing pressure but in dead
nakamal there is no customary leader to receive it (score: + 1).
Similarly, customary law gives authority to customary leaders to control/
adjust fishing seasons and zoning to reduce fishing pressure, but in dead
nakamal there is no customary leader to receive it because authority is
either absent (no direct owners) or disputed as some people may still
have ancestry relations to the area and stake primary or secondary
rights claims (score: + 1). Customary fishers cannot agree on how to
improve fisheries management and therefore do not participate in the
management of the resources because they cannot work together or with
the government to improve resource sustainability (score: -2).
4.2.4. Resource allocation and management processes
4.2.4.1. Government. No information from the literature was found
about transparency and trust on resource allocation systems and processes.
However, experience suggest that this is likely to be deficient,
particularly when money is involved (score: -1).
Similarly, there is not enough information from the literature about
transparency and trust on collection and use of resource access fees, but
experience indicate it is likely to be unfair and distributed asymme-
trically (score: -1).
Over the years the Government has been encouraging community-
based marine conservation programs, resulting in a strong increase in
such initiatives (the number of local-level marine management mea-
sures more than doubled from 1993 to 2001) [66]. More recently, the
government has introduced the Community Conservation Area (CCA)
Act, which gives villagers the power to register a CCA and request the
state to enforce rules and improve conditions of registered CCA. These
are indicative of effective integration of knowledge but its effectiveness in
dead nakamal is only partially successful as reef fishes are over-
Fig. 3. Story cycle in areas with customary authority (A) and in dead nakamal (B) for customary fishers actors in Vanuatu. Key: CF: customary fisher; G: government;
CL: Customary leader (chief); R: resource; KE: Resource monitoring and knowledge governance sub-system; Co: Consumption, production, and distribution gov-
ernance sub-system.
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harvested (score: 0)
4.2.4.2. Customary. Customary resource allocation systems and processes
are not transparent nor trusted in dead nakamal because customary
authority is disputed. Another indication of how ineffective resource
allocation systems and process are is due to people's attempt to justify
access and authority using unusual (from a customary perspective)
family links (score: -2).
No information was found from the literature about access fees in
customary areas, but when it happens, fees are often kept by chiefs or
leaders and may not be distributed to reef owners in general (score: -1).
Despite the sense of ownership some locals have about the resource
and the occasional use of customary fishing practices there is limited
integration of knowledge to support resource allocation and management
because neither customary nor western management practices are used
and incorporated in dead nakamal (score: 0).
Table 4
Scores for the resource allocation and extraction governance sub-system for case study in Vanuatu.
Governance attributes (actors (A), interactions
(I), outcomes (O))
Assessment criteria Score
Authority to distribute fishing rights and collect
access fees (A)
Government Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to governance actors that have interest in
long-term sustainability of the resource
+1
Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to governance actors that have a
knowledge of the resource system
+1
Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to governance actors that have the
capacity to undertake the role
−1
Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to trusted governance actors − 1
Authority is given to governance actors who are able to facilitate sectoral cooperation and
coordinate activities between the various resource harvesters and users
0
Authority is given to governance actors who are able to learn (knowledge capacity) − 1
Customary leaders Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to governance actors that have interest in
long-term sustainability of the resource
−2
Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to governance actors that have a
knowledge of the resource system
−2
Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to governance actors that have the
capacity to undertake the role
−2
Authority to distribute fishing rights is allocated to trusted governance actors − 2
Authority is given to governance actors who are able to facilitate cooperation and
coordinate activities between the various resource harvesters and users
− 2
Authority is given to governance actors who are able to learn and transmit knowledge
(knowledge capacity)
− 2
Resource harvesters (A) Customary Fishers Resource harvesting rights are allocated to actors that have interest in long-term
sustainability of the resource
−2
Harvesters are able to switch to other resources or sources of income 1
Harvesters have knowledge about sustainable fishing harvest in their area −2
Extractive capacity of resource harvesters matches sustainable fishery yields −2
Other Fishers Resource harvesting rights are allocated to actors that have interest in long-term
sustainability of the resource
−2
Harvesters are able to switch to other resources or sources of income 1
Harvesters have knowledge about sustainable fishing harvest in their area −2
Extractive capacity of resource harvesters matches sustainable fishery yields −2
Authority allocation processes (I) Government Authority Authority enables actor to control/adjust seasons, zoning or use other instruments to
reduce pressures on the resource
1
Authority enables actor to control/adjust resource amount or numbers of harvesters 1
Resource harvesters participate in the management of the resource (e.g. co-management
arrangements)
− 2
Customary Authority Authority (formal) enables actor to control/adjust seasons, zoning or use other instruments
to reduce pressures on the resource.
+ 1
Authority (customary) enables actor to control/adjust seasons, zoning or use other
instruments to reduce pressures on the resource
+1
Authority enables actor to control/adjust resource amount or numbers of harvesters + 1
Resource harvesters participate in the management of the resource (e.g. co-management
arrangements)
− 2
Resource allocation and management process (I) Government Transparent and trusted resource allocation systems and processes − 1
Transparent and trusted collection and use of resource access fees −1
Effective integration of knowledge that supports resource allocation and management
(knowledge transmission capacity)
0
Customary Transparent and trusted resource allocation systems and processes − 2
Transparent and trusted collection and use of resource access fees −1
Effective integration of knowledge that supports resource allocation and management
(knowledge transmission capacity)
0
Impacts on the resource (O) Sustainable extraction levels − 2
Sustainable distribution of fishing pressures in the fishing area −2
Sustainable interactions with other systems (bycatch, impacts on other resources and
supporting ecosystems)
−1
Socio-economic outcomes (O) Benefits shared in a way that is perceived to be fair/equitable. − 2
Access fees/other industry contributions are invested in the maintenance/improvement of
the resource and SES
−2
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4.2.5. Impacts on the resource
Dead nakamal are overfished, which means extraction levels are not
sustainable (score: -2). Fishing pressure is not sustainably distributed in
dead nakamal because they are ‘open to all’ to fish (score: -2). No in-
formation in the literature was found about sustainable interactions with
other systems (bycatch, impacts on other resources and supporting ecosys-
tems), but overall management is poor even in areas that are not dead
nakamals. Moreover, customary management limits access to outsiders
but often not to inclusive stakeholders nor on amounts of resources
exploited (score: -1).
4.2.6. Socio-economic outcomes
Resources are not equitably shared in a way that is perceived to be fair/
equitable due to the disputes over customary authority and unusual
attempts to justify access and authority over them (score: -2).
Resources in dead nakamal are over-exploited, therefore there are no
benefits to those who use the resource, claim or contest ownership,
resulting in no re-investment (human or financial) to improve the resource
and SES (score: -2).
Fig. 4 depicts the inter-play of governance attributes influencing the
state of coastal marine resources. Weak points of the governance system
(Outcomes and Actors; extremely ineffective, and ineffective, respec-
tively) are potential intervention points to improve adaptive capacity in
dead nakamal.
5. Conclusion
Over the history of human societies, effective governance arrange-
ments have helped actors cope with and adapt to environmental
changes [97]. Climate and other environmental changes generate
challenges to achieving sustainable operation of governance systems
within marine SES. Appropriate governance is a critical factor in ad-
dressing these challenges and understanding governance structures and
their operation, strengths and vulnerabilities is essential for the selec-
tion and effective implementation of adaptation strategies.
Here, we have presented a transparent analytical framework to
disentangle the different components of governance of marine SES. This
complements the growing body of literature on operationalising IAD
framework [e.g. [14,38]]. The application of the framework assists with
gaining detailed understanding of various components of marine gov-
ernance systems, their interactions and effects on the policy issue under
investigation [98]. It may be particularly useful when dealing with
complex governance systems that have a broad range of actors who
influence, use and manage marine resources and are guided by different
sets of rules, ranging from customary systems to national and interna-
tional laws and regulations. By linking various criteria describing pre-
conditions of adaptive capacity to particular governance attributes, the
analytical framework also yields insights into the role particular rules,
actors and interactions may play in adaptation process and its out-
comes. The framework can also help identify appropriate systems and
instruments that can be used to direct SES towards a certain outcome
through policy interventions.
The analytical framework has been applied to a particular marine
governance system in Vanuatu. In the opinion of the authors, this re-
search developed a robust theoretical framework to characterise and
assess governance systems. It proved to be helpful in identifying key
governance issues influencing the adaptive capacity of coastal com-
munities in Vanuatu. It also highlighted the importance of sociocultural
influences on the ways in which adaptations can be developed and
sustained [99]. However, being a new tool, the framework needs to be
further tested and refined in other marine resource governance systems
and comparative studies. It can also be further expanded to incorporate
other governance sub-systems, broaden the range of criteria developed
in the study and examine their relative importance and limitations in
specific types of marine governance or problem contexts. These are
important directions of further research.
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